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Montana v. United States-Effects on Liberal Treaty
Interpretation and Indian Rights to Lands
Underlying Navigable Waters
Title to lands underlying navigable waters1 gives the titleholder
important rights and powers, including mineral rights and jurisdic-
tional powers. 2 Indian rights to such lands have been a frequently
litigated question.3 This issue has arisen when an Indian tribe has
claimed title to lands underlying navigable waters based upon a
treaty executed and ratified before a state entered the Union. This
area of law is still unsettled, however, because two well-established
doctrines appear to clash in these cases-liberal treaty interpretation 4
and equal footing.5 The Supreme Court of the United States, in
Montana v. United States ,6 has seemingly ended the controversy by im-
pliedly overruling the use of liberal treaty interpretation when apply-
ing the equal footing doctrine. However, the Court's seemingly
narrow construction of the equal footing doctrine in Montana, may
not be correct.
This note examines Montana and its effect on liberal treaty inter-
pretation and the equal footing doctrine, and on Indian claims to
lands underlying navigable waters. Part I reviews the liberal treaty
interpretation and equal footing doctrines; Part II analyzes Montana;
1 The courts have had problems in defining "navigable waters." Compare Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 170 (1979) with 444 U.S. at 182 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See
generally Note, Indian Rights to Landr Underlying Navigable Waters: StateJurisdiction Under the Equal
Footing Doctrine vs. Tribal Sovereignty, 55 N.D. L. REV. 453, 454 n.17 (1979) (navigability stan-
dards described) [hereinafter cited as Note, Indian Rights]. The difficult questions involved
there are beyond the scope of this note.
2 The Indians' beneficial interests in the lands are significant. For example, the owners
of beds or tidelands can receive revenue from the river's natural resources and dam projects
on the body of water. The owner may also restrict access to the water for recreational and
commercial purposes. Finally, ownership of the beds and tidelands can have important judi-
cial consequences by dictating whether a federal, state, or tribal court has subject matter
jurisdiction over a particular cause of action. See, e.g., Note, Indian Righs, supra note 1, at 453-
54.
3 See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Choctaw Nation v. Okla-
homa, 397 U.S. 620 (1970); Holt State Bank v. United States, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); Confeder-
ated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Finch, 548 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1976), vacatedper cunvam, 433 U.S. 676 (1977).
4 See notes 7-15 and accompanying text in/a.
5 See notes 16-30 and accompanying text infra.
6 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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Part III critiques Montana; and Part IV discusses Montana's
implications.
I. Liberal Treaty Interpretation and the Equal Footing Doctrine
A. Liberal Treaty Interpretation
Indian treaties approved pursuant to the Articles of Confedera-
tion and the United States Constitution are equivalent to treaties
with foreign nations. 7 Yet, Indian treaties are also very different.8
The differences caused the Supreme Court of the United States to
develop liberal treaty interpretation principles. These principles
were summarized by the Supreme Court in Choctaw Nation ofIndians v.
United States :9
[T]reaties are construed more liberally than private agreements,
and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written
words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practi-
cal construction adopted by the parties. . . . Especially is this true
in interpreting treaties and agreements with the Indians; they are to
be construed so far as possible in the sense in which the Indians
understood them, and "in a spirit which generously recognizes the
full obligation of this nation to protect the interests of a dependent
people.". . . But even Indian treaties cannot be rewritten or ex-
panded beyond their clear terms to remedy a claimed injustice or to
achieve the asserted understanding of the parties.' 0
The principles established in Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United
States developed because the relative bargaining positions of the par-
ties to the treaties were substantially disproportionate. The United
States occupied the superior position for many reasons. The United
States was more advanced technologically; it was a united nation; the
treaties were written in its language, English; and its representatives
were not only skilled negotiators but understood the significance of
the legal terms they inserted into the treaties."
7 W. CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAw 78 (1981); Comment, Indian Land Claims Under the
Nonintercourse Act, 44 ALBANY L. REv. 110, 118 (1979) (Indian treaties and foreign treaties
have the same dignity and legal force). See Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 242-43
(1872); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832). Since Indian treaties are
made pursuant to the United States Constitution, they also take precedence over any conflict-
ing state law. U.S. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (supremacy clause); W. CANBY at 78. See generall,
Note, State Sovereignty and Indian Land Claims: The Validity of New York's Treaties Prior to the
Nonintercourse Act of 1790, 31 SYRACUsE L. REv. 797, 816-17 (1980).
8 See Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1899).
9 318 U.S. 423 (1943).
10 Id at 431-32 (citations omitted). Except in purely political cases, the Supreme Court
also established that the judiciary should interpret the treaties. 175 U.S. at 32.
11 175 U.S. at 10-11.
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On the other hand, the Indian tribes were scattered and divided.
The Indians did not believe in and found it hard to comprehend land
ownership. 12 The vast majority of the Indians were unfamiliar with
the written language, much less the meaning of legal terms. They
relied on what the United States' interpreters said the treaties
meant.' 3 Finally, many of the treaties were forced on the Indians
and they had no choice but to consent.
14
These policies led the Supreme Court to adopt liberal treaty in-
terpretation principles for determining an Indian treaty's real mean-
ing. The Court did not intend courts to use these principles to
rewrite or expand a treaty's terms.15 Thus, in any case involving the
interpretation of an Indian treaty, liberal treaty interpretation prin-
ciples seem a fair way to proceed. Yet, these principles appear to
clash with the equal footing doctrine in cases involving lands under-
lying navigable waters.
B. The Equal Footing Doctrine
The Supreme Court in Shively v. Bowlby 16 established the consti-
tutional doctrine of equal footing. 17 This doctrine creates a presump-
tion that lands underlying navigable waters passed to a state upon its
admission to the Union, and that after admission these lands could
not be granted away by Congress.18 The Supreme Court in Shivey
added, however, that in certain circumstances Congress could grant
lands underlying navigable waters before a state entered the Union.19
12 See Morrison, Comments on Indian WaterRights, 41 MoNT. L. REV. 39, 43 (1980) (quoting
A. JOSEPHY, THE INDIAN HERITAGE (1968)).
13 175 U.S. at 10-11.
14 Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-31 (1970).
15 318 U.S. at 432.
16 152 U.S. 1 (1894). Shivey involved a dispute over title in certain lands below the high
water mark in the Columbia River in Oregon. Id at 9.
17 This doctrine does not rest on an express provision of the United States Constitution,
but rather on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution that this country is a
union of political equals. Note, Indian Rights, supra note 1, at 456.
18 Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845).
19 152 U.S. at 48. The Colirt stated that these circumstances existed:
[W]henever it becomes necessary to do so in order to perform international obliga-
tions, or to effect the improvement of such lands for the promotion and convenience
of commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, or to carry out
other public purposes appropriate to the objects for which the United States holds
the Territory.
Id The Court in fontana found that the establishment of an Indian reservation can be an
"appropriate public purpose" within the meaning of Shively. Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. at 556. Se also Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 258-59 (1913) (holding that a
river bed may be granted by executive order as well as by an Act of Congress).
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The policies behind the equal footing doctrine are twofold.
First, the Supreme Court wanted to avoid the piecemeal distribution
of lands underlying navigable waters.20 Second, the Court wanted
the states admitted into the Union after the Constitution's adoption
to have the same rights as the original states in the lands underlying
navigable waters.
21
In United States v. Holt State Bank,22 the Supreme Court examined
the policies behind equal footing, and decided to strengthen the pre-
sumption against congressional grants of lands underlying navigable
waters prior to a state's entering the Union. There, the Court held
that such grants "should not be regarded as intended unless the in-
tention was definitely declared or otherwise very plain.,
2 3
More than forty years later, the State of Oklahoma argued in
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma24 that the bed of the Arkansas River was
not included in the grant to the Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw
Nations. The state argued that under a skilled draftsman's accepted
standard for ordinary conveyancing "the land description in the trea-
ties, standing alone, actually excluded the river bed."
25
Justice Marshall, writing for a plurality, rejected this argument
and instead applied the principles of liberal treaty interpretation in
20 152 U.S. at 50.
21 Id at 26.
22 270 U.S. 49 (1926). Holt State Bank involved an action to quiet title in Mud Lake,
which is within what was formerly known as the Red Lake Indian Reservation in Minnesota.
Id at 52-53.
23 Id at 55. This notion requiring definitely declared intent or an "otherwise very plain"
indication of intent had been previously adopted by the Supreme Court as a general guide-
line for construing all grants by the sovereign to private individuals. Caldwell v. United
States, 250 U.S. 14, 20 (1919); Note, Indian Rights, supra note 1, at 462. In determining
whether there has been a disposal of land to the Indians, however, a number of factors have
been considered by the Supreme Court that are not considered for individuals. These factors
include economic dependence on the waters and submerged lands, evidence of congressional
intent to establish a sovereign but dependent nation, and whether the language of the agree-
ment included the submerged land, applying either the reasonable language or treaty inter-
pretation principles. Note, Indian Rights, supra note 1, at 460-61. See, e.g., Alaska Pacific
Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918); Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
Thus, the Holt State Bank addition to Shively may not have been a principled extension in cases
involving Indian treaties.
In Shively, the Supreme Court established the equal footing doctrine to prevent piece-
meal distribution of lands underlying navigable waters to individuals. 152 U.S. at 50. A
grant to an independent but dependent nation, such as the Indians, differs significantly from
a grant to an individual and, therefore, should be treated differently.
24 397 U.S. 620 (1970). The sole question the Supreme Court faced was whether the
treaty grants from the United States conveyed title to the bed of the Arkansas River to the
Cherokee and Choctaw Nations. As a practical matter, the ownership of minerals beneath
the riverbed and the dry land were at stake. Id at 621, 628.
25 Id at 628.
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determining whether the treaties in Choctaw conveyed the lands
under the Arkansas River to the Indians.2 6 He concluded that under
the circumstances and terms of the treaties, such a grant had been
made to the Indians.
27
Justice Marshall determined that Holt State Bank did not prevent
the Court from using liberal treaty interpretation principles because
Holt State Bank also looked at the circumstances surrounding the
treaty.2 8 Applying liberal treaty interpretation principles under-
mines the equal footing doctrine's presumption against conveyance
of lands underlying navigable waters prior to statehood.2 9 In effect,
where Indian treaties are involved, applying liberal treaty interpreta-
tion principles may actually provide a presumption of conveyance.
And, in light of the circumstances surrounding Indian treaties, such a
result is not unwarranted.
30
Both equal footing and liberal treaty interpretation are well es-
tablished principles the Supreme Court follows, 31 but these two prin-
ciples appear to clash when the Court decides disputes between
Indian tribes and states over title to lands underlying navigable wa-
ters. In Holt State Bank, the Court expressed a preference for the
equal footing doctrine, while in Choctaw the Court seemed to favor
liberal treaty interpretation. Yet, Choctaw's questionable preceden-
tial value left the question unsettled. 32 In Montana v. United States ,33 a
recent Supreme Court case, the Court had an opportunity to resolve
the question and yet failed to do so.
II. Montana v. United States
In Montana, the United States, proceeding in its own right and as
a fiduciary for the Crow Tribe of Montana (Crow Tribe),34 filed a
26 Id at 630-31.
27 Id at 631.
28 Id at 634. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, carefully distinguished Holt State
Bank, placing heavy emphasis upon the granting of fee simple title to the Indian Nations in
Choctaw. Id. at 638-39 (Douglas, J., concurring).
29 See Note, Indian Rights, supra note 1, at 470-71.
30 See notes 64-70 and accompanying text in'fra.
31 See notes 7-21 and accompanying text supra.
32 Only seven justices participated in Choctaw. Two justices joined Justice Marshall's
opinion, Justice Douglas concurred and the other three justices joined Justice White's dissent.
33 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
34 As the United States became the sole western power on the continent, treaties became
primarily an instrument of land transfer. See Note, Indian Rights- What r Let??, 41 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 75, 76 (1979). One commentator suggests that the present legal relation between "the
Indians and the federal government may be a type of trust, with legal title in the United
States and the equitable title in the Indians." Morrison, supra note 12, at 43. See Nadeau v.
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suit seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment quieting
title to the Big Horn River bed in the United States as trustee for the
Crow Tribe.35 The Crow Tribe based its ownership claim on the trea-
ties of 1851 and 1865, which created the reservation and antedated
Montana's entrance into the Union.
36
If these treaties conveyed the riverbed before Montana entered
the Union, then the United States would have been holding the
riverbed in trust for the Crow Tribe. But, if they did not convey the
riverbed, the riverbed would have passed to Montana upon its ad-
mission to the Union.37 The issue's resolution, therefore, rested on
the Court's interpretation of the treaties. The Court concluded that
title to the riverbed passed to Montana upon its admission to the
Union.38
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, further clarified the
test to be used in determining whether the United States had con-
veyed lands underlying navigable waters before a state entered the
Union. He stated that a strong presumption existed against such
conveyances and that courts "must not infer such a conveyance 'un-
less the intention was definitely declared or otherwise made
plain,'. . . or was rendered 'in clear and especial words,'. . . or 'un-
less the claim confirmed in terms embraces the land under the waters
of the stream.' 3 9 He also stated that "some international duty or
public exigency" would be sufficient to uphold a pre-statehood
conveyance. 4o
Next, Justice Stewart examined and compared the treaties in
Holt State Bank and Montana. In Holt State Bank, the United States
promised the Chippewas to "set apart and withold from sale, for the
Union Pac. R.R., 253 U.S. 442, 445-46 (1920). This notion finds support in the federal gov-
emnment's power to revoke the grant of lands underlying navigable waters, and the power by
statute and regulation to protect the public rights in lands underlying navigable waters.
Thus the United States retains title in trust for the tribe. See Note, Indian Rights, supra note 1,
at 472.
35 450 U.S. at 549. The United States also sought a declaratory judgment establishing
that it and the Tribe had sole authority to regulate hunting and fishing within the reservation
and an injunction requiring Montana to secure the permission of the Crow Tribe before
issuing a hunting or fishing license for use within the reservation. Id
Relying on its purported ownership of the bed of the Big Horn River and on its inherent
power as a sovereign, the Crow Tribe claimed authority to prohibit all hunting and fishing by
non-members of the Crow Tribe on non-Indian property within the reservation. Id. at 566-
67. The State of Montana prevailed on both claims. Id.
36 Id at 548, 553-55.
37 Id at 550-51.
38 Id at 556-57.
39 Id at 552 (citations omitted).
40 Id (quoting Hol State Bank, 270, U.S. at 55).
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use" 4 ' of the Chippewas a large tract of land and to convey "a suffi-
cient quantity of land for the permanent homes" 42 of the Indians.
The Supreme Court in Holt State Bank found the language in the
treaties reserved "in a general way for the continued occupation of
the Indians what remained of their aboriginal territory. '43 The
Court concluded in Holt State Bank that the bed of the navigable lake
remained in trust for future states and did not pass to the
Chippewas.44
In Montana, the 1851 treaty did not formally convey any land to
the Indians, but instead represented a covenant among several tribes
recognizing specific boundaries for their respective territories.45 This
treaty was thus analogous to the one in Holt State Bank.
The 1868 treaty, however, expressly conveyed land to the Crow
Tribe. This treaty described the reservation land in detail and
stated that such land was "set apart for the absolute and undisturbed
use and occupation of the Indians herein named .... *"46 But since
"[t]he treaty in no way expressly referred to the riverbed, . . . nor
was an intention to convey the riverbed expressed in 'clear and espe-
cial words,'. . . or 'definitively declared or otherwise made very
plain,"' 47 Justice Stewart concluded that this language was not
strong enough to overcome the presumption against conveyance.
48
Justice Stewart's conclusion in Montana was contrary to the
holding in United States v. Finch .49 There, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, using liberal treaty interpretation
principles, construed the 1868 treaty as granting to the Crow Tribe
all the lands within the described boundaries, including the
riverbed.50 Yet, the parties in Finch had agreed that the United
States retained a navigational easement in the navigable waters for
the benefit of the public, regardless of who owned the riverbed.51
41 Id (quoting Treaty of Sept. 30, 1854, 10 Stat. 1109 (1855)).
42 Id (quoting Treaty of Feb. 22, 1855, 10 Stat. 1165 (1855)).
43 450 U.S. at 553 (quoting Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 58).
44 United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 58-59.
45 450 U.S. at 553.
46 Id (quoting Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, May 7, 1868, art. II, 15 Stat. 650 (1868)).
47 450 U.S. at 554 (citations omitted).
48 Id Justice Stewart does admit, however, that a property right was created but never
bothers to define it. He simply found that it was not enough to meet the test the Court had
established. Id
49 548 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1976), vacatedper euriam, 433 U.S. 676 (1977) (vacated on other
grounds). The Ninth Circuit relied on this case in deciding Montana. See United States v.
Montana, 604 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1979).
50 450 U.S. at 554 (citing Anch, 548 F.2d at 829).
51 450 U.S. at 555.
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Based on this, Justice Stewart, in discussing Finch, concluded that the
phrases in the 1868 treaty,52 "whatever they seem to mean literally,
do not give the Indians exclusive right to occupy all the territory
within the described boundaries. 53 Thus, it appears the Supreme
Court, in Montana, overruled the Finch holding and its use of liberal
treaty interpretation.
In a footnote to the Court's opinion, Justice Stewart also at-
tempted to distinguish Choctaw from the case before him.54 He noted
that the circumstances and terms of the Choctaw treaties differed in
two important respects from those in the Montana treaties. First, the
treaties in Choctaw had special historical origins, and second, the trea-
ties gave the Indians fee simple ownership of the land and promised
the Indians freedom from state jurisdiction. 55 Thus, Justice Stewart
impliedly held that the presence of these two factors made the con-
veyance "clear" enough to overcome the presumption against
conveyance.
Justice Stewart then concluded his analysis by admitting that
the establishment of an Indian reservation can be an "appropriate
public purpose" within the meaning of Shivey justifying a congres-
sional conveyance of a riverbed.56 He asserted, however, that the
Crow Indians at the time of the treaties presented no "public exi-
gency." He seemingly limited "public exigency" to tribes that require
fishing as an important part of their diet or way of life. Since he
found that the Crow Indians were nomadic and did not rely on fish-
ing for their livelihood, no "public exigency" existed in Montana .57
III. Critique
The Supreme Court in Montana impliedly decided that the lib-
eral treaty interpretation principles are inapplicable when determin-
ing whether the Indians or the states own lands underlying navigable
waters.58 The Court's failure to squarely address this issue and to
52 See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
53 450 U.S. at 555.
54 The Crow Tribe relied upon Choctaw in its contention that the reservation included
the bed of the Big Horn River.
55 450 U.S. at 555-56 n.5.
56 See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
57 450 U.S. at 556. In dissent, Justice Blackmun questions this conclusion. 450 U.S. at
570 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See notes 71-76, 94 and accompanying text infa.
58 Although the majority opinion did not discuss liberal treaty interpretation, Justice
Stevens, in his concurring opinion, stated that Choctaw should not be read "as having been
intended to indicate that the strong presumption against disposition by the United States of
lands under navigable waters in the territories is not applicable to Indian reservations." He
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balance the policies behind liberal treaty interpretation and equal
footing will now be discussed. Also, the questionable precedential
value of the cases supporting the test set forth by Justice Stewart,5 9
the applicability of the equal footing doctrine's Holt State Bank exten-
sion to Montana, and the strict construction given "public exigency"
by the Court will be discussed.
A reasoriable interpretation of Montana could be that the
Supreme Court impliedly held that liberal treaty interpretation prin-
ciples are inapplicable when applying the equal footing doctrine.
60
Justice Stewart stated that, "whatever [the 1851 and 1865 treaties]
seem to mean literally," they do not give the Indians the exclusive
right to occupy all the territory within the described boundaries.
6'
He deviated from liberal treaty interpretation principles which
would require a court to look at the literal meaning of an Indian
treaty.62 Further, in distinguishing Choctaw, Justice Stewart seemed
to impliedly require an explicit grant of fee simple title to overcome
the equal footing doctrine's presumption against conveyances of
lands underlying navigable waters.63 Liberal treaty interpretation
principles, however, provide that the "technical meaning of words"
64
should not guide the interpretation of an Indian treaty.6
5
The Supreme Court in Montana should have squarely addressed
the application of liberal treaty interpretation principles to lands un-
derlying navigable waters. Even though liberal treaty interpretation
principles appear to substantially undermine the strong presumption
against conveyance, this is only fair considering the policies involved.
As discussed earlier, the policies behind equal footing are twofold.
The Supreme Court wanted to avoid piecemeal distribution of lands
underlying navigable waters, and the Court wanted the states admit-
ted into the Union after the Constitution's adoption to have the same
rights as the original states in the lands underlying navigable wa-
emphasized that the equal footing doctrine applies to lands underlying navigable waters on
Indian reservations. Id at 567-68 (Stevens, J., concurring).
59 See notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra.
60 See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
61 450 U.S. at 555.
62 See Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1899).
63 See 450 U.S. at 555-56 n.5.
64 175 U.S. at 11.
65 In Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842), an opinion the majority in Montana
used to support its test, the Supreme Court recognized that in deciding cases involving lands
underlying navigable waters the "strict technical meaning of the words" should not govern.
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 411.
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ters.6 6 Making a grant to an entire Indian tribe is not the type of
piecemeal distribution the Court feared in establishing the equal
footing doctrine.67 Further, the establishment of Indian reservations
are an "appropriate public purpose,"6 8 and since states are not enti-
tled to lands granted under an appropriate public purpose,69 the sec-
ond policy consideration used in establishing the equal footing
doctrine does not apply to grants creating an Indian reservation.
Since many grants have been made to the Indian tribes through
treaties, it would only seem fair that the treaties be construed so as to
ascertain their true meaning. Therefore, to determine if a treaty
grants to an Indian tribe the title to lands underlying navigable wa-
ters, liberal treaty interpretation principles should be applied. Even
if courts applied these principles, not all cases involving Indian trea-
ties would result in the conveyance of the lands underlying navigable
waters. For example, in Holt State Bank the circumstances and terms
of the treaty, interpreted according to liberal treaty interpretation
principles, would not justify such a conveyance. 70
Montana, however, would be decided differently if the Supreme
Court had applied liberal treaty interpretation principles. The terms
of the 1865 treaty,71 if literally construed, support the argument that
the United States conveyed the riverbed to the Crow Tribe.72 Fur-
ther, as pointed out by Justice Blackmun in dissent, the reference in
the 1868 treaty to the midchannel of the Yellowstone River as part of
the reservation's boundary could only be interpreted to mean the
Crow Tribe owned the river. Thus, since they owned half of this
river boundary, it would only follow that they completely owned all
the rivers within their boundaries. 73 Finally, the historical setting of
the 1868 treaty also points to a complete grant to the Crow Tribe.
Justice Blackmun, in dissent, referred to United States Commissioner
Taylor's speech at Fort Laramie in 1867 to support this interpreta-
66 See notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
67 In Shively, the Supreme Court did not want to allow conveyances to individuals, al-
though it never mentioned an Indian tribe. 152 U.S. at 50.
68 See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
69 See 450 U.S. at 556.
70 See 270 U.S. at 57-59.
71 The 1865 treaty provided that such land would be "set apart for the absolute and
undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians herein named .. " See note 46 and accom-
panying text supra.
72 When the terms of the 1865 treaty are read in light of the circumstances surrounding
the creation of Indian treaties, it could reasonably be asserted that an Indian would under-
stand the terms to mean a grant of all the lands, including the underlying navigable waters.
See notes 7-15 and accompanying text supra.
73 450 U.S. at 578-79 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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tion. In that speech, Commissioner Taylor referred to the land as the
Crow Tribe's land, and he also stated that the United States initiated
the treaty talks to provide the Crow Tribe with relief from encroach-
ment by "white people."' 74 This latter point somewhat parallels the
circumstances in Choctaw since encroachment existed there also.
75
Chief Blackfoot, in response to Commissioner Taylor's speech, made
reference to the Crow Tribe's ownership of all the land, including the
rivers. 7
6
The majority's use of Martin v. Waddell77 and Packer v. Bird78 to
support the test it set forth is also suspect. According to the majority,
Martin supported the proposition that a grant of lands underlying
navigable waters will only be acceptable if made in "clear and espe-
cial words."'
79
Martin involved land in one of the original thirteen states. It was
an action between a person claiming title to the lands underlying
navigable waters through a patent by the English Crown and an-
other person claiming title through a grant from the State of New
Jersey.80 In discussing the patent, the Court stated that:
In such cases, whatever does not pass by the grant, still remains in
the crown for the benefit and advantage of the whole community.
Grants of that description are therefore construed strictly-and it
will not be presumed that he intended to part from any portion of
that public domain, unless clear and especial words are used to denote
it.a1
The grant in Martin, however, differed significantly from the
grant in Montana. In Montana, the grant was made to an entire In-
dian tribe, not just to an individual. The grant to an individual
presents a greater danger of violating the policies behind equal foot-
ing than does the 1868 treaty's grant to the Crow Tribe.8 2 In a re-
cent case83 involving the interpretation of an Indian treaty to
determine the ownership of lands underlying navigable waters, the
74 Id at 578.
75 Compare Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 574-75 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), with
Choctaw, 397 U.S. at 623. Both cases involved miners.
76 450 U.S. at 578 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
77 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
78 137 U.S. 661 (1891).
79 450 U.S. at 552.
80 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 407.
81 Id at 411 (emphasis added).
82 See notes 67-69 and accompanying text supra.
83 Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1982).
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit distinguished Martin's "clear
and especial word" test, by stating that:
The requirement was explicitly characterized as dictum ...
Moreover, the underlying rationale for this requirement is of doubt-
ful relevance to a reservation of land by a sovereign Indian tribe.
Such a reservation does not, properly speaking, involve a "grant" of
public land. . . . Nor does it convert public domain into an indi-
vidual's private property.
84
Furthermore, a grant from the English Crown differs from a
grant by the United States to an Indian tribe, since the people who
received the grants in Martin, unlike the Indians in Montana, at least
knew the language. More importantly, the people receiving grants
from the English Crown understood land ownership and sought out
the Crown for grants, while the Indians did not believe in and could
not conceive of land ownership.
8 5
The Supreme Court in Montana also relied on Packer v. Bird8 6 for
the proposition that a grant of lands underlying navigable waters
cannot be made "unless [the] claim confirmed in terms embraces the
land under the water of the stream. 81 7 In applying this proposition
to Montana, the Court ignored that the grant in Packer only involved
one person, not an entire Indian tribe as in Montana. Thus, the possi-
bility of piecemeal distribution in Packer was greater than in Mon-
tana,88 and the individual's familiarity with the written language
further distinguishes Packer from Montana .89
In Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation,
Montana v. Namen,90 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in
discussing the presumption against conveyances of lands underlying
navigable waters before a state entered the Union and the test estab-
lished in Montana, noted that the Montana Court emphasized that
"Congress was, of course, aware of this presumption once it was es-
tablished by this Court." 91 No evidence exists, however, that the pre-
sumption against pre-statehood federal grants of lands under
navigable waters had been established at the time the treaty involved
was negotiated and ratified. The earliest statement of the presump-
84 Id at 961 n.27 (citations omitted).
85 See Morrison, supra note 12, at 43 (quoting A. JOSEPHY, THE INDIAN HERrrAGE
(1968)).
86 137 U.S. 661 (1891).
87 450 U.S. at 552 (citation omitted).
88 See notes 67-69 and accompanying text sup ra.
89 See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
90 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1982).
91 Id at 961 n.27 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 552 n.2).
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tion appeared in Holt State Bank seven decades after the treaty in-
volved in Namen. Hence, this indicates that perhaps the presumption
against conveyances should not have been applied in Montana.
92
The majority also established in its test that a "public exigency"
will overcome the presumption against conveyances. 93 But Justice
Stewart seemed to limit "public exigency" in the Indian context to
Indian tribes that depend on fishing for their livelihood.
9 4
It appears that neither the circumstances nor the case law re-
quired such a narrow reading of "public exigency." In Montana, as in
Choctaw, Congress had responded to "pressure for Indian land by es-
tablishing reservations in return for the Indians' relinquishment of
the claim to other territories."95 Congress also wanted to "provide
for the Crow Indians. ' 96 The United States' retaining title to the
riverbed "would have been inconsistent with each of these pur-
poses."'97 Further, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
held that a railroad98 and a wildlife refuge99 are "public exigencies."
It seems reasonable that an Indian reservation be given status equal
to a railroad or wildlife refuge. Thus, the reservation's establishment
could have been held to be the "public exigency" necessary to over-
come the presumption against conveyance.
IV. Implications
Justice Stewart sets forth a reasonable test in Montana,100 but he
failed to apply the principles of liberal treaty interpretation under
this test or to specifically reject its application in cases involving a
possible grant of lands underlying navigable waters to an Indian
92 Rd at 961 n.27. Since the treaties in Montana also were negotiated and ratified at about
the same time as the Namen treaty, one could argue that the Namen court's rationale could be
applied to Montana.
93 450 U.S. at 552.
94 Id at 556. Justice Blackmun questioned the Court's factual premise. At trial, the
United States presented evidence that the Crows ate fish as a supplement to their buffalo diet
and as a substitute for meat in times of scarcity. Id at 570 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
95 Id at 574.
96 Id at 571.
97 Id
98 United States v. City of Anchorage, 437 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1971). The court
had to determine whether the United States retained title to lands underlying navigable wa-
ters. The United States had used the lands to build the Alaska Railroad. Id at 1083. The
court noted that its analysis, as in Choctaw, involved "no express reservation of the lands
underlying navigable waters, but the Court found an implicit intention to pass such lands to
the Indian Nations in the treaties between the Government and the Indians made prior to
Oklahoma's statehood." Id at 1085 n.7.
99 United States v. Alaska, 423 F.2d 764 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 967 (1970).
100 See notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra.
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tribe. By ignoring the principles of liberal treaty interpretation, 01 he
established a difficult, if not impossible, presumption for an Indian
tribe to overcome except in certain narrowly defined circumstances.
Montana indicates that the United States will only have granted
Indian tribes title to lands underlying navigable waters before a state
entered the Union if the treaty specifically conveys the lands under
the navigable waters, 0 2 the entire grant is in fee simple, 0 3 or the
Indians have the fishing "public exigency." 0 4 These are very narrow
exceptions, especially since the poorly drafted treaties rarely mention
the riverbeds or grant land in fee simple, and since most inland In-
dian tribes, like the Crow Tribe, probably did not rely on fishing for
their livelihood.10 5 But a closer examination of the Supreme Court's
test and a recent Ninth Circuit case suggest that Montana does not
have to be so narrowly construed.
Possibly the most critical aspect of Justice Stewart's opinion is
his seemingly narrow definition of "public exigency."' 06 Lower fed-
eral courts, as well as Justice Blackmun, have construed "public exi-
gency" more liberally.' 0 7 One lower court case 0 8 provides a basis
upon which "public exigency" could be read more liberally and yet
not be inconsistent with Montana.
A sense of "urgency" could provide the basis for a "public exi-
gency." In Namen, a Ninth Circuit case, the Kootenai Indians de-
pended heavily on fishing as part of their diet so they met the fishing
"public exigency" as defined in Montana.10 9 The court, however,
went on to suggest that the urgency with which the Office of Indian
Affairs pressed the Senate to ratify the treaties involved demon-
stration that securing the Indians' assent to the large areas of the
Washington territory was a "public exigency." A "public exigency"
existed because the United States believed that to end the ongoing
war, it had to grant the Indians all the land, including lands underly-
ing navigable waters. 0 This approach further emphasizes how im-
portant it is to consider the actual situation surrounding the signing
101 See notes 60-65 and accompanying text supra.
102 See notes 79,87 and accompanying text supra.
103 See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
104 See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
105 See 450 U.S. at 556.
106 See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
107 See notes 95-99 and accompanying text supra.
108 Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1982).




and ratification of a treaty in determining whether a public exigency
existed.
The sense of urgency found in Namen did not exist in Montana.
The need to avert war provided the basis for the "urgency" in
Namen, 11' while in Montana the encroachment by the United States"
2
did not reach the level of "urgency" found in Namen. Hence, these
cases are consistent, and Namen provides a reasonable extension of
"public exigency."
V. Conclusion
Courts apply the equal footing doctrine to cases involving title
to lands underlying navigable waters that were granted to the Indi-
ans before a state's entering the Union.113 Such grants are often
found in treaties. A conflict arises, however, between the equal foot-
ing doctrine's strong presumption against conveyances and the prin-
ciples of liberal treaty interpretation which require courts to construe
Indian treaties liberally. Following the plurality decision in Choctaw,
the question remained unsettled. Montana, the most recent Supreme
Court case on the issue, implies that liberal treaty interpretation
principles are inapplicable when courts apply the equal footing doc-
trine to pre-statehood grants of lands underlying navigable waters. 
114
Since the Court failed to specifically resolve the issue, the implication
of this decision seems to be that few Indian treaties will be found to
have conveyed to Indian tribes title to lands underlying navigable
waters prior to a state's entering the Union. Perhaps the Supreme
Court will adopt the Ninth Circuit's broad interpretation of "public
exigency," so as to include grants made by the United States in a
sense of "urgency."" 5 This would help mitigate Montana's detrimen-
tal effect on an Indian tribe's right to land, which the principles of
liberal treaty interpretation seek to protect.
Anthony A. Lusvardi
111 See notes 109-110 and accompanying text supra.
112 450 U.S. at 574-75 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
113 See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Choctaw Nation v.
Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970); Holt State Bank v. United States, 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
114 See notes 60-65 and accompanying text supra.
115 See notes 109-110 and accompanying text supra.
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